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  EVIDENTIALISM, VICE, AND VIRTUE 
Jason Baehr 
Loyola Marymount University 
jbaehr@lmu.edu 
 According to evidentialism, epistemic justification is a function of the evidence one has 
in support of one’s beliefs. More precisely, evidentialists subscribe to the following general 
principle: 
(E)  A person S is justified in believing a proposition p at time t if and only if S’s 
evidence at t supports p.1 
“Evidence” should be construed broadly here such that it includes (or might include) supporting 
beliefs, experiential and introspective states, and rational insights. It is less clear how exactly to 
understand the relevant support relation. But according to one intuitive and fairly standard 
account, one’s evidence supports a proposition just in case it makes this proposition more 
probable than not.2 As this suggests, the kind of support in question – as well as epistemic 
justification itself – is a matter of degree.3  
Evidentialism has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms in recent years, many of 
which have been aimed at showing that the satisfaction of (E) is not necessary for justification.4 
My concern here is with the sufficiency of (E). I begin by discussing several cases in which a 
belief apparently satisfies (E) but fails to instantiate one or more varieties of epistemic 
justification that presumably are of interest to evidentialists. I go on to argue, however, that this 
problem does not warrant abandoning the thrust of evidentialism. Instead it calls for 
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supplementing (E) with a constraint according to which (under certain conditions) justification 
requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thus reveals an important link between the 
recent enterprise of virtue epistemology and a more traditional, evidentialist account of 
knowledge.  
 Before getting started, a methodological point is in order. There are at least two notably 
different ways of understanding what might be involved with showing that the satisfaction of (E) 
is not sufficient for epistemic justification. The first is predicated on the idea that there exists a 
single determinate and univocal concept of epistemic justification and that disputes about the 
nature of justification are disputes about this concept. Here, arguing against the sufficiency of (E) 
involves arguing that a belief can satisfy (E) but fail to instantiate the concept in question. There 
are, however, serious problems with the idea that there exists a single determinate and univocal 
concept of justification. Indeed, as William Alston has argued, much of the debate in 
epistemology in recent years suggests that there are several such concepts or several “epistemic 
desiderata.”5 But if there are a variety of different concepts of epistemic justification, what would 
it mean to argue that the satisfaction of (E) is not sufficient for justification?  
 We can see an answer to this question by noting that while there may be a rather wide 
and diverse variety of epistemic desiderata, it is plausible to think that evidentialists are 
interested in a certain limited subset of them, and indeed, perhaps just in a single desideratum. 
This is, at any rate, what I shall be assuming here. Thus my concern shall be limited to what 
might be called “evidentialist-relevant” or “e-relevant” varieties of justification, which again are 
varieties the nature of which at least some evidentialist accounts of justification presumably are 
aimed at capturing.6 My immediate aim, then, is to show that a belief can satisfy (E) while failing 
to instantiate one or more e-relevant varieties of justification. 
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I. Problem Cases 
A. Cases of defective inquiry 
My argument for the claim just noted centers around two kinds of cases. In cases of the 
first sort, a belief satisfies (E) but only because the person in question either fails to inquire at all 
relative to this belief or else inquires in a manner that is clearly defective.  
Case 1. George is the epitome of intellectual laziness, apathy, and obliviousness. He goes 
about his daily routine focusing only on the most immediate and practical concerns: 
feeding himself, getting to work on time, doing his job in a minimally satisfactory way, 
paying the bills, etc. He lacks any natural curiosity and is almost entirely tuned out to the 
news of the day. Unsurprisingly, George has many beliefs he should not and fails to 
believe many things he should. In the former category is George’s belief that exposure to 
secondhand smoke poses no significant health risks. Given his extremely narrow and 
practical focus, George is entirely oblivious to all of the well-publicized research 
indicating the dangers of secondhand smoke. In fact, George’s belief that no such link 
exists is positively supported by his evidence. He remembers, for instance, having heard 
from a reliable source some years ago that scientists had failed to establish any 
correlation between exposure to environmental smoke and various health problems. And 
as far as he knows, the research on this topic has not changed; nor does he have any 
reason to think that it might have changed. Finally, George’s own parents smoked a great 
deal in his and his siblings’ presence, and neither he nor they have had any major health 
problems.  
Case 2. Gerry holds the same belief as George and on roughly the same grounds. 
Therefore he too has positive reasons for believing that secondhand smoke is not a health 
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hazard. Unlike George, however, Gerry is not oblivious to the news of the day; in fact he 
is reasonably inquiring and likes to check things for himself. The problem is that his 
inquiries tend to be insufficiently demanding and discriminating. He is prone to 
gullibility, carelessness, and hasty generalization. Upon hearing the news reports 
affirming the danger of secondhand smoke, Gerry decides to look further into the matter. 
The first item he comes across happens to be a report published by an organization with 
major financial ties to the tobacco industry. The report is aimed, not at a fair and balanced 
treatment of the issue, but rather at exposing any apparent weakness or grounds for doubt 
in the recently publicized research. To any reasonably intellectually demanding and 
discriminating inquirer, the dubious nature of the report would be evident. But to Gerry it 
is not. And the result is that Gerry’s total evidence (which includes his initial evidence for 
thinking that secondhand smoke is benign) supports his belief.7  
In each of the above cases, the person’s belief is well-supported by his accompanying evidence; 
thus the beliefs in question seem clearly to satisfy (E). The problem is that the reason these 
beliefs are well-supported traces back to certain defects on the part of the individuals who hold 
them. George has good evidence for his belief only on account of his intellectual “tunnel vision.” 
And Gerry’s belief remains well-supported because of his undemanding and undiscriminating 
method of inquiry. In light of these shortcomings, the beliefs of George and Gerry seem clearly 
to be unjustified. And it is plausible to suppose that the variety of justification in question is an e-
relevant one.8  
In response to cases of this general sort, Richard Feldman (2004, 2005) offers a defense 
of the sufficiency of (E) the upshot of which is that there is no e-relevant sense of justification 
according to which the beliefs of George and Gerry are unjustified. According to Feldman, an 
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evidentialist theory of justification is concerned strictly with the relation between a person’s 
evidence and her belief. It makes no difference whether this evidence is the result of (say) 
uncritical or hasty inquiry or whether the person has the evidence only on account of failing to 
inquire at all. While these factors may bear on the evaluation of the believer’s intellectual 
character or doxastic methods, Feldman claims, they have no bearing on the justificatory status 
of beliefs that result from such character or methods. 9  
 Perhaps there is some epistemic value simply in having a belief that fits one’s evidence – 
regardless of whether this evidence is the result of defective inquiry. Such beliefs might be said 
to involve a kind of logical coherence or consistency, which indeed is often regarded as an 
epistemic desideratum.10 Moreover, as Feldman reasonably queries, what other doxastic attitude 
could plausibly be required of agents like George or Gerry?11 Clearly it would be problematic, 
given their evidence, to suggest that either of them ought to believe that secondhand smoke is 
harmful – or even, for that matter, to suspend judgment on the issue. Thus there does appear to 
be a sense of justification according to which the beliefs of George and Gerry are justified. And 
there is little reason not to regard this as an e-relevant species of justification.  
 But this hardly puts (E) in the clear. For the fact that the beliefs of George and Gerry 
instantiate some e-relevant variety of justification guarantees neither (a) that there is not an 
additional variety of e-relevant justification that these beliefs fail to instantiate, nor (b) that the 
variety of justification they do instantiate is particularly worthy or significant. Both of these 
possibilities merit further consideration. 
 First consider (a). Despite whatever justification the beliefs of George and Gerry may 
enjoy, there is indeed an additional intuitive and e-relevant sense in which these beliefs are 
unjustified. For while the beliefs are well-supported in the relevant sense, the support or evidence 
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clearly is not what it should be. George, for instance, ought to have taken notice of some of the 
widely publicized research establishing a link between exposure to secondhand smoke and 
various diseases. Similarly, it ought to have occurred to Gerry to undertake a broader inquiry and 
to pay closer attention to the authorship of the relevant report. He too should be aware of the 
evidence against his belief. Since the beliefs of George and Gerry are based on evidence they 
clearly ought not to possess, there is a straightforward sense in which they ought not believe as 
they do; that is, there is a straightforward sense in which their beliefs are unjustified. And again, 
the kind of justification in question seems clearly to be e-relevant. 
 One way of drawing further attention to this variety of justification is to consider how we 
might evaluate certain actions of George or Gerry that are based on the beliefs in question. 
Suppose, for instance, that on the basis of his belief that secondhand smoke is benign, George 
proceeds regularly to smoke in the company of his children. Clearly we would condemn 
George’s behavior, despite the fact that from his own perspective he is doing no harm. And the 
reason is that he ought not to have this perspective in the first place; he ought not believe as he 
does. For again, evidence against this belief is abundant and readily available to him. He ought to 
be aware of this evidence and to believe in accordance with it. This strongly suggests that his 
present belief is, in a genuine and e-relevant sense, unjustified. 12  
 Now consider (b). While the beliefs of George and Gerry may instantiate a certain 
epistemic desideratum, the significance or worth of this desideratum is questionable. To see why, 
note that the evidence bases possessed by George and Gerry are in a certain substantial way 
defective or contaminated – and for reasons that trace back to these individuals’ own epistemic 
wrongdoing. Again, had either George or Gerry been even minimally attentive and 
discriminating in his thinking about the relevant subject matter, his perspective regarding the 
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truth of the claim in question would have been very different and considerably more accurate. 
Things being what they are, however, why think that George or Gerry does particularly well 
from an epistemic standpoint to believe on the basis of his evidence? What is especially 
epistemically good or worthy about believing in accordance with a defective or contaminated 
evidence base, particularly when the defects in question are attributable to one’s own cognitive 
failure? It would seem not much. My suggestion is not that George and Gerry ought to believe, 
against their evidence, that environmental smoke is harmful. But this is to say very little favor of 
the former alternative. It is entirely consistent with this alternative’s having only a very minimal 
significance or value.  
Cases like that of George and Gerry are analogous to what moral philosophers sometimes 
call “tragic dilemmas,” which are situations in which a person is forced to choose between “sin 
and sin” or between “the lesser of two evils.”13 Consider the case of Bertie, who having 
squandered the semester partying with his friends and playing video games, is presently faced 
with the dilemma of cheating on one of his final exams (his only hope for passing a course that 
he needs to graduate on time) or devastating his parents (who have sacrificed a great deal to pay 
for Bertie’s education and have planned a major family reunion in honor of Bertie’s graduation). 
On at least one plausible analysis of the situation (assuming, say, that these really are Bertie’s 
only options and that his family would be sufficiently devastated as a result of his failure to 
graduate), Bertie ought to cheat on the exam. Indeed we might say that, given the circumstances, 
this is the only real or justifiable option. At the same time, however, this is not to say anything 
very positive about Bertie’s action. While it may be the “lesser of two evils,” it is an “evil” 
nonetheless. Similarly, while George and Gerry in some sense do well to believe in accordance 
with the evidence they have (e.g. in doing so they avoid believing or withholding belief on no 
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basis whatsoever), this is not to say anything too positive about them or their beliefs, for again, 
each one believes in accordance with a defective evidence base, the very defects of which are a 
result of his own cognitive wrongdoing. The point, then, is that while the beliefs of George and 
Gerry may instantiate a certain e-relevant concept of justification, this variety of justification is 
not a very significant epistemic desideratum. Their beliefs are, as it were, the lesser of two 
epistemic evils in the situation. We may conclude that a belief can satisfy (E) while failing to 
instantiate any significant e-relevant concept of justification.14  
B. Cases of defective “doxastic handling” of evidence 
 In the cases just discussed, the epistemic status of a belief is undermined on account of 
some prior mistake or defect on the part of the believer, and specifically, on account of whether 
or how the believer inquired at some point in the past relative to the belief in question. In a 
second set of cases indicating the insufficiency of (E), the epistemic status of a belief is affected 
by an occurrent mistake or defect on the part of the agent. Specifically, it is affected by the 
agent’s “doxastic handling” of information that threatens to defeat or undermine her justification, 
that is, by the way in which she treats or regards this information at the time of belief. In the first 
case, the agent ignores or suppresses the potential defeater; in the second case she distorts or 
misrepresents it.  
Case 3. Like George and Gerry above, Daphne believes that exposure to secondhand 
smoke poses no serious health risks; she also has some positive evidence in support of 
this belief. However, she is neither intellectually lazy nor undiscriminating. Upon hearing 
about the relevant research, she does some looking into the matter and nearly all the 
information she comes across indicates that in fact environmental smoke is hazardous. 
Daphne’s problem is that she is a hypochondriac raised by two chain-smoking parents. 
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Therefore, owing to extreme anxiety about her own health, she cannot bring herself to 
accept any of the relevant evidence; indeed she quickly and conveniently (though 
genuinely) “forgets” about or suppresses it. Thus, as far as Daphne is aware, her evidence 
continues to support her belief.15 
Case 4. Doris also believes with some positive evidence that secondhand smoke is 
benign. Upon hearing the news reports to the contrary, she too engages in reasonably 
careful and discriminating inquiry on the matter and in doing so encounters a host of data 
that threaten to refute her belief. Like Daphne, Doris is unable to accept this data. But in 
Doris’s case, this is due to her own extremely strong attachment to smoking. Her habit of 
smoking wherever and whenever she wants represents one of few pleasures in her 
otherwise lonely and unhappy existence. Unlike Doris, Daphne’s cognitive constitution is 
such that she cannot simply “forget” or suppress the relevant evidence. Instead she 
distorts or misrepresents certain critical aspects of it. The result is that from her 
standpoint, the case for thinking that environmental smoke is hazardous is a weak one 
and her original belief remains well-supported.16 
There can be little doubt that there is an e-relevant sense in which the beliefs of Daphne and 
Doris are unjustified. Daphne is suppressing evidence of which she has recently been made 
aware that casts major doubt on her belief. Doris, though not exactly suppressing or ignoring 
such evidence, is distorting or misrepresenting key elements of it. Nevertheless, the beliefs of 
Daphne and Doris are well-supported from their respective points of view.  
 Evidentialists are unlikely to deny that the beliefs of Daphne and Doris are unjustified. 
They may, however, attempt to argue that these beliefs fail to satisfy (E) and hence do not 
present a problem for their position. Specifically, they might argue that what matters for 
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justification from an evidentialist standpoint is not whether it seems to a person that her belief is 
well-supported by her evidence, but rather whether her belief really is well-supported. This 
objection draws attention to a certain ambiguity surrounding (E). It indicates the need to 
distinguish between the following two more precise formulations of the central evidentialist 
principle:  
(E2) S is justified in believing p at t if and only if S’s evidence at t appears to S to 
support p.  
(E3) S is justified in believing p at t if and only if S’s evidence at t in fact supports p.  
The suggestion, then, is that an evidentialist might respond to the cases of Daphne and Doris by 
claiming that evidentialism should be understood along the lines of (E3) rather than (E2), and 
that once it is, these cases cease to pose a problem for evidentialism.  
(E3) does apparently provide the evidentialist with a way around the Daphne and Doris 
cases.17 For both Daphne and Doris presumably are in possession of evidence that in fact tells 
decisively against their beliefs.18 The problem, in Daphne’s case, is that she is ignoring or 
suppressing this evidence; Doris, on the other hand, is distorting or misrepresenting it. But given 
that the evidence in question is in their possession, and that it actually tells against their beliefs, 
(E3) rules (plausibly) that these beliefs are unjustified. 
 But (E3) is problematic on other grounds. Consider cases of belief that involve what 
might be referred to as “deeply hidden” evidential relations, which are relations that obtain 
between a person’s evidence base and one of her beliefs, but that are extremely difficult to 
discern, even from the standpoint of an entirely normal and well-functioning cognitive agent. 
Presumably such relations exist.19 If so, (E3) entails that if a person’s evidence base seems, by all 
appearances, to support a certain claim p, but on the basis of a “deeply hidden” entailment 
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relation in fact supports a different claim q, this person is justified in believing q. But this is 
extremely implausible, for the person is in question is entirely unaware of the fact that her 
evidence actually supports q.20 
 To see how an evidentialist might try to amend (E3) in light of this problem, note that 
most evidentialists also embrace internalism about epistemic justification. According to one 
standard version of internalism,21 a person is justified in believing a given claim only if he has 
“direct and unproblematic access” to any factors that justify this belief. If supplemented with an 
internalist condition, (E3) becomes: 
(E4) S is justified in believing p at t if and only if S’s evidence at t in fact supports p 
and S has direct and unproblematic access to this fact at t.  
(E4) allows the evidentialist to deal with one problematic aspect of the case just noted, since it 
entails (plausibly) that the person in question is not justified in believing q (the proposition 
supported by the hidden evidential relation).22 But a serious problem remains. For not only is it 
implausible to think that this person is justified in believing q, it is extremely plausible to think 
that she is justified in believing p (the proposition supported by “all appearances”).23 But if (E4) 
is correct, this person is not justified in believing p, for her evidence in fact supports q.24  
 One way around this difficulty would be to narrow the scope of the internalist element of 
(E4) such that justification is a function of the actual relation between a person’s belief and those 
aspects of the person’s evidence to which she has direct and unproblematic access. This would 
yield the following principle:  
(E5) S is justified in believing p at t if and only if the aspects of S’s evidence to which S 
has direct and unproblematic access at t in fact support p.25   
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(E5) can handle both aspects of the case under consideration. It rules (plausibly) that the person 
in question is not justified in believing q because, while q is supported by the totality of this 
person’s evidence, it is not supported by that part of her evidence to which she has direct and 
unproblematic access (i.e. the “unhidden” part). It also rules (plausibly) that the person is 
justified in believing p, for the part of this person’s evidence to which she has direct and 
unproblematic access does in fact support p. 
 But while (E5) is an improvement over (E4) in one respect, it is vulnerable in a way that 
(E4) is not. For unlike (E4), (E5) generates the wrong result in connection with the very cases 
that led us to distinguish between various formulations of evidentialism in the first place: viz. the 
Daphne and Doris cases. The details of these cases can easily be refined such that Daphne and 
Doris lack the kind of access required by (E5) to the relevant counterevidence, with the 
implausible result that their beliefs satisfy (E5) and thus are justified. We might imagine, for 
instance, that Doris is so attached to smoking at will that if she were to curtail her habit in any 
way (which she would feel compelled to do if she were honest with herself about the relevant 
evidence), her psyche would begin to unravel. Thus it would take some rather extreme measures 
(e.g. hypnosis or therapy) to get her to confront this evidence honestly. On this rendering of the 
case, Doris presumably lacks anything like “direct and unproblematic” access to that part of her 
evidence that she is distorting or misrepresenting. Therefore, since the evidence to which Doris 
does have the required kind of access in fact supports her belief, (E5) rules (implausibly) that her 
belief is justified.26 
 There is in fact a notable irony in such cases that further tells against the plausibility of 
(E5). It consists in the fact that the more defective the individuals in question are, the more likely 
they are to be justified according to (E5). For instance, the more Daphne suppresses or ignores 
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the relevant counterevidence, the more problematic and less direct her access to this evidence 
will become, and thus the more likely it is that her belief will be justified according to (E5). This 
is problematic, of course, because it is precisely this self-deception that intuitively undermines 
the justification of Daphne’s belief in the first place.  
 We began this section by considering how two additional cases pose a problem for the 
sufficiency of (E). This led to a distinction between (E2) and (E3). According to the former, 
justification requires mere “apparent support” between one’s belief and one’s evidence, while 
according to the latter, it requires “actual support.” Problems with (E3) led to a consideration of 
two related principles, (E4) and (E5), both of which we also found susceptible to serious 
objections. My concern in the remainder of the paper is with (E2). I argue that (E2) can be 
modified in a way that preserves the thrust of evidentialism and avoids the problems that plague 
these other formulations. 
II. Modifying Evidentialism 
 We have examined two sets of cases in which a belief satisfies (E2) but fails to instantiate 
any interesting variety of e-relevant justification. Thus (E2) clearly stands in need of 
modification. To see what form this modification should take, it will be helpful to look again at 
the various cognitive defects manifested in the cases in question. Doing so will provide an 
indication of what further, positive requirement should be added to (E2). 
The defects in question include the following: intellectual laziness, inattentiveness, lack 
of intellectual discrimination, gullibility, carelessness, disregard for the truth, ignoring and 
distorting counterevidence, self-deception, and more. One striking feature of this list is that it 
consists entirely of intellectual vices, that is, of bad or defective traits of intellectual character. It 
is on account of an exercise of such traits that the individuals in Cases 1-4 above lack 
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justification for their beliefs. One strategy for amending (E2), then, would be to make the 
antidote to intellectual vice a necessary condition for justification.27 This antidote is of course 
intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtues include excellences of intellectual character like 
carefulness and thoroughness in inquiry, inquisitiveness, attentiveness, fair-mindedness, open-
mindedness, intellectual honesty, and intellectual integrity. Thus it might be thought that (E2) 
should be supplemented with an additional condition that makes an exercise of intellectual virtue 
a necessary condition for justification. This would yield something like the following principle:  
(E6) S is justified in believing p at t if and only if S’s evidence at t appears to S to 
support p and S exercises virtues of intellectual character in the formation of this 
belief. 
There is, however, at least one immediate and formidable problem with (E6).28 The 
problem is posed by cases of “brute” or “passive” justification, which are cases in which 
justification results primarily from the mere brute or default functioning of the subject’s 
cognitive equipment.29 Suppose, for example, that while working late one night in my well-lit 
study, the electricity suddenly and unexpectedly shuts off, immediately causing the room to go 
dark. In response, I automatically and without thinking form a belief to the effect that the room 
has grown dark. Intuitively, my belief is justified. It is also justified according to (E2), since my 
belief is (and appears to me to be) well-supported by my visual experience. However, it is not 
justified according to (E6), for there is little reason to think that I have exercised any virtues of 
intellectual character in the formation of this belief. Again, this belief, together with my evidence 
for it, is the product (more or less) of sheer “cognitive mechanics,” that is, of the natural or 
rudimentary functioning of my cognitive apparatus. Virtuous agency is not involved in any 
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significant way.30 This shows that an exercise of intellectual virtue cannot be a necessary 
condition for justification. 
We have found, then, that a belief can be unjustified on account of the believer’s 
exhibiting vicious agency, but that it is implausible to make virtuous agency a necessary 
condition for justification. If so, how can (E2) be modified – beyond the addition of a purely 
negative and unilluminating amendment to the effect that justification requires an absence of 
vicious agency – such that it precludes the relevant manifestations of intellectual vice? The 
apparent solution is to modify (E2) such that it requires something like an exercise of intellectual 
virtue, but only in cases like the ones discussed earlier (not in cases of passive or brute 
justification). This can be done by supplementing (E2) with a certain proviso or constraint. 
To get an idea of what exactly this constraint should look like, we must examine more 
closely the difference between Cases 1-4 above, on the one hand, and cases of brute or passive 
justification, on the other. The principal difference between the two concerns the role of personal 
agency in the formation of the relevant belief. In the former set of cases, the agency of the 
believer is involved; in the latter kind of case, it is not. Recall, for example, the case of Gerry. 
His agency bears immediately on the content of his evidence: his evidence is what it is largely 
because he has inquired in an undiscriminating and careless way. He then forms his belief on the 
basis of this evidence. Personal agency is also involved in the formation of the beliefs of Daphne 
and Doris. Here it bears most immediately, not on the content of the agent’s evidence, but rather 
on how the agent handles or regards this evidence. Doris, for instance, distorts or misrepresents 
critical elements of her evidence. She then forms her belief on the basis of the resulting 
evidential perspective.31  
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Thus, in Cases 1-4, personal agency makes a salient contribution to what we might call 
the “evidential situation” of the subject in question, meaning that it largely determines either the 
content of the subject’s evidence or how this subject handles or regards this evidence.32 By 
contrast, in cases of brute or passive justification, the believer’s agency does not contribute to his 
or her evidential situation. In the case of passive justification discussed above, for instance, I 
acquire and confront the relevant evidence concerning the lighting in my study simply as a result 
of brute or natural cognitive functioning. My evidential situation does not implicate or involve 
my agency in any significant way.  
We are now in a position to see how (E2) should be amended. The following is a 
“constrained” version of (E2): 
(CEJ) S is justified in believing p at t if and only if S’s evidence at t appears to S to 
support p, provided that if S’s agency makes a salient contribution to S’s 
evidential situation with respect to p, S functions (qua agent) in a manner 
consistent with intellectual virtue.  
Several elements of (CEJ) merit explanation or discussion. First, note that the virtue requirement 
in (CEJ) does not have universal application: it applies only to cases in which a person’s 
evidential situation involves or implicates her agency in the relevant sense. Thus (CEJ) is not 
proposing an additional necessary or defining condition for knowledge. Rather it is laying down 
a constraint regarding when or under what conditions a belief’s being supported by good 
evidence generates justification. Second, the “qua agent” qualification in the final clause of 
(CEJ) serves to underscore the fact that while an agent’s brute cognitive machinery might be in 
good working order, and thus that the agent might be “functioning” well or virtuously at one 
level, (CEJ) requires virtuous agency. Third, (CEJ) does not require that a believer actually be 
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intellectually virtuous. It does not require, for instance, that the virtuous conduct in question flow 
from a fixed or settled disposition on the part of the believer (as it would with one who is 
genuinely virtuous).33 Fourth, (CEJ) does not demand that a believer manifest the height of 
intellectual virtue or that her intellectual conduct be maximally intellectually virtuous. It requires 
merely that she function in a manner consistent with intellectual virtue, that is, that she refrain 
from functioning in a way that a virtuous person characteristically would not.34 
Two general observations concerning (CEJ) are also in order. First, (CEJ) generates the 
correct result in connection with Cases 1-4 above. None of the subjects in these cases turn out to 
be justified according to (CEJ), for in each case, while the person’s agency does make a salient 
contribution to his or her evidential situation, the person fails to function in a manner consistent 
with intellectual virtue. Moreover, (CEJ) can explain why, in cases of brute or passive 
justification, a person can be justified absent any virtuous activity. For again, these are cases in 
which the subject’s agency does not bear on his or her evidential situation. Second, a 
commitment to (CEJ) does not require the repudiation of internalism, at least on standard ways 
of understanding this doctrine. Internalism requires that a believer have direct and unproblematic 
access to the factors that justify her belief. But while it is doubtful that we always have access to 
whether we have, say, inquired in an intellectually virtuous way, (CEJ) does not thereby require 
the repudiation of internalism, for (as noted above) it does not maintain that virtuous functioning 
or activity is itself a defining feature of justification or a “justifying factor.” Again, the notion of 
virtue is intended to play a mere background or constraining role. 
III. BonJour’s Evidentialism 
Before concluding, it is worth examining how something like (CEJ) has in fact been 
gestured at – even if not elaborated on – in some of the evidentialist literature. Laurence BonJour 
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is one of the most prominent defenders of an evidentialist-type account of epistemic justification. 
According to BonJour, justification depends on the possession of good epistemic reasons, or 
reasons for thinking that one’s belief is true. For present purposes, this may be read as the claim 
that justification depends on the possession of good evidence.35  
In an early work (1985), BonJour draws an explicit and apparently rather strong 
connection between the notion of good epistemic reasons and that of epistemic responsibility. He 
says that epistemic responsibility is the “core notion” of epistemic justification conceived in 
terms of such reasons.36 In more recent work, however, BonJour describes the relation between 
justification and epistemic responsibility in weaker terms. He maintains that while justification 
and responsible epistemic conduct often go hand-in-hand, they do not always do so, and thus that 
justification should not be defined or analyzed in terms of epistemic responsibility or related 
concepts.37 Nevertheless, in a recent work on a priori justification (1998), BonJour suggests that 
the concepts of epistemic responsibility or intellectual virtue might yet have some role to play in 
connection with an analysis of justification. 
According to BonJour’s initial proposal regarding the nature of a priori justification, a 
person is a priori justified in believing a given claim just in case he has “rational insight” into the 
necessity of this claim.38 Without getting into the details of this account, it should be noted, first, 
that rational insight as BonJour understands it is a source of good epistemic reasons: it is capable 
of providing believers with cogent grounds in support of the truth of certain necessary 
propositions. Thus BonJour’s position on a priori justification conforms to his broader position 
on justification noted above and can reasonably be regarded as evidentialist in nature. Second, 
while the above represents BonJour’s initial formulation of his view, he goes on in a discussion 
regarding the fallibility of a priori justification to claim that, strictly speaking, a priori 
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justification requires mere apparent rational insight; it does not require that beliefs justified a 
priori be true. This qualification enables BonJour to account for a variety of putative cases of a 
priori justification in which the belief in question turned out to be false.39 
As this brief sketch suggests, BonJour seems clearly to favor a version of evidentialism 
along the lines of (E2) rather than (E3) above: that is, a version according to which justification 
is a function of whether, from the believer’s standpoint, her belief is well-supported by her 
grounds. BonJour is aware, however, that a quasi-subjective account of justification like this one 
is open to certain objections to which a more objective account along the lines of (E3) is not. 
One such objection is what he refers to as the argument from “dogmatism and bias.”40 Roughly, 
the worry here is that an account of justification that requires mere apparent support between a 
person’s evidence and her beliefs will (implausibly) sanction beliefs that enjoy such support only 
on account bias or dogmatism on the part of the believer (i.e., cases in which, were the person in 
question not thinking in a biased or dogmatic way, her belief would not appear to her to be 
supported by her evidence). Such cases bear a clear resemblance to some of the cases discussed 
earlier, for instance, to the cases of Daphne and Doris. Again, these are cases in which a belief 
appears to be well-supported but only because the person in question is suppressing or distorting 
a potential defeater.  
In response to this objection (and elsewhere41), BonJour makes the critical point that on 
his view, only rational insights that have been arrived at on the basis of “reasonably careful 
reflection” have any epistemic significance.42 Such reflection, he maintains, is inconsistent with 
dogmatism and bias; elsewhere he indicates that it is inconsistent with other intellectual vices 
like carelessness, inattention, and intellectual sloppiness.43 Thus, on BonJour’s view, if a given 
claim appears to be well-supported by one’s evidence, but this appearance is a product of vicious 
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or irresponsible cognitive activity, then one is not justified in believing this claim. BonJour 
characterizes the relevant requirement as a “background condition” on a priori justification.44 
This condition bears a close similarity to the constraint incorporated into (CEJ). For it 
requires believers to avoid intellectually vicious or irresponsible cognitive conduct and to engage 
in virtuous or responsible conduct (i.e. in “careful reflection” on their beliefs).45 Moreover, 
BonJour apparently does not regard the virtuous or responsible activity in question as a defining 
element of a priori justification. On his view, the sole basis of such justification is the possession 
of good epistemic reasons acquired via pure thought or reason; and he makes clear that the 
relevant kind of cognitive activity does not itself enter into such reasons.46 Rather, BonJour’s 
view is apparently that to generate justification, the possession of such reasons must occur within 
a certain context or against a certain backdrop or “background,” viz., one in which the believer in 
question is functioning in an intellectually virtuous way. Thus for reasons that reflect some of the 
points discussed earlier, BonJour apparently thinks that a suitable version of evidentialism will 
include a virtue-component.47 
There are, however, at least two notable ways in which the virtue-component included in 
(CEJ) may differ from the one that BonJour has in mind. First, BonJour’s constraint appears to 
be concerned merely with the “doxastic handling” of evidence, that is, with how an agent is 
presently treating or regarding her grounds for her belief.48 It is not clear that he intends for the 
constraint to apply to the process of inquiry that generated these grounds. However, as the cases 
of the George and Gerry show, a belief can fail to be justified on account of its being the product 
of intellectually vicious inquiry – even if at present the agent handles or regards his evidence for 
this belief in a responsible or virtuous way.  
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Second, and more importantly, BonJour does not indicate that his “background 
condition” is intended to apply only to a certain limited number of cases. Rather he appears to 
view it as applying to any instance of a priori justification.49 We saw above, however, that such a 
requirement is too demanding. Again, in cases of brute or passive justification, a person can 
acquire and properly attend to good reasons or evidence in support of a given claim without 
exercising virtuous agency. This is because evidence is sometimes acquired and “handled” in a 
manner governed (more or less) by mere “cognitive mechanics,” or the brute functioning of 
one’s basic cognitive equipment.50  
IV. Conclusion 
We have seen that a plausible evidentialist account of epistemic justification must be 
supplemented by a proviso or constraint which, when applicable, requires cognitive agents to 
function in a manner characteristic of intellectual virtue. We have also seen that such a constraint 
has been gestured at (though never fully developed) in some of the evidentialist literature. This 
discussion reveals a notable connection between evidentialist accounts of justification and the 
much more recent development of virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemologists give the concept 
of an intellectual virtue a central role in epistemological theorizing.51 According to some virtue 
epistemologists, an exercise of intellectual virtue is a defining feature of knowledge.52 The 
conclusion of the present paper does not go this far. We have, in fact, examined reasons for 
denying that virtuous motives and actions are a necessary or defining feature of knowledge or 
justification. Nonetheless, we have seen that an adequate evidentialist account of knowledge 
must at least make use of the concept of an intellectual virtue. On such an account, this concept 
will occupy an important background or constraining role. It is apparent, then, that evidentialists 
and virtue epistemologists are concerned with some common conceptual territory and that they 
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would benefit from being in conversation twith each other. Indeed it is plausible to suppose that 
further reflection on this shared territory would lead to additional interesting avenues of 
inquiry.53 
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1 Though not all of them employ the term “evidentialism,” defenders of the basic position indicated by (E) include 
Laurence BonJour (1985), Roderick Chisholm (1989), Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2004), and Richard 
Swinburne (2001). 
2 See, e.g., Swinburne 2001, Ch. 3.  
3 While epistemic justification arguably is an essential feature of knowledge, (E) should not be read as capturing that 
which, in addition true belief, is necessary for knowledge. For knowledge may require a degree of evidential support 
not required by (E). Furthermore, the satisfaction of (E) does not rule out Gettier factors. Thus one can have a true 
belief that satisfies (E) but that falls short of knowledge.  
4 See, e.g., Goldman 2001 and Plantinga 1993. In fact the objection is that the satisfaction of the condition specified 
in (E) is unnecessary for justification. For ease of discussion, however, I will speak of satisfying or failing to satisfy 
(E) itself. For a defense of evidentialism against some of these objections, see Conee and Feldman’s Evidentialism 
(2004).  
5 Alston 1993. According to Alston, different camps of epistemologists (e.g. internalists and externalists) appear to 
be concerned with fundamentally different concepts of justification. Alston compares the attempt to provide an 
analysis of justification understood as a single, univocal concept to a “quixotic tilting at windmills” (542).  
6 I will not attempt to spell out the notion of e-relevant justification in any detail here. However, given the close 
association between evidentialism and internalism (an association discussed in more detail below), e-relevant 
varieties of justification are likely to be internalist in nature; and paradigmatically externalist varieties of 
justification are likely not to count as e-relevant. 
7 For a similar kind of case, see Korblith 1983. John Greco (2005) also raises a related worry for evidentialism.  
8 This is evident in the fact that there is something irresponsible about the cognitive conduct – and the resulting 
beliefs – of both George and Gerry. For, as we shall see in more depth below, evidentialists (e.g. BonJour 1985) 
sometimes draw a close connection between justification and cognitive responsibility.  
9 See, e.g. Feldman 2005, p. 281; cf. Conee and Feldman 2004, p. 90, 101.  
10 See, e.g., Swinburne’s discussion of “synchronic justification” in 2001, Ch. 1. See also Feldman 2005, pp. 277-78.  
11 2005, p. 282. See also Feldman and Conee 2004, Ch. 4.  
12 Nothing about this or the former assessment of these cases presupposes an objectionable doxastic voluntarism. 
While George and Gerry may lack direct control over their beliefs, they presumably have a sufficient amount of 
indirect control. For presumably they have control over the cognitive behavior (e.g. the inquiry or lack thereof) that 
produces these beliefs. Thus there is no problem with saying that the beliefs are unjustified or that George and Gerry 
ought not to have these beliefs.  
13 See, e.g., Hursthouse 1998 and Geach 1977. 
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14 Though on largely different grounds, Greco (2005) also argues that internalism is mistaken “about any interesting 
or important sort of normative status” (260).  
15 We may stipulate that she has no recollection of having encountered the counterevidence or having suppressed it. 
Thus from her standpoint, the totality of her evidence indeed supports her belief.  
16 Again we can stipulate that Doris is unaware of having distorted or misrepresented the relevant data and thus as 
far as she can tell, her belief is supported by her evidence. 
17 Note, however, that (E3) is still susceptible to the George and Gerry cases discussed earlier; for their beliefs, 
while intuitively unjustified, are in fact well-supported by their evidence.  
18 On the assumption that the relevant evidence is not actually in their possession, matters are even worse for (E3). 
For in this case, the beliefs in question are well-supported by the relevant evidence and so turn out (implausibly) to 
be justified.  
19 Swinburne (2001) offers an example along these lines of a detective in possession of a great deal of evidence 
regarding a certain murder. It follows from the detective’s evidence “by a complicated line of argument” that a 
certain suspect is guilty. However, “the detective is overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of evidence and so has not 
seen the relevance of this piece of evidence” (154). Conee and Feldman (2001, p. 73) discuss a similar sort of case; 
as does BonJour (1998, p. 128).  
20 Perhaps the belief is justified in a certain robustly externalist sense. But such justification presumably is not e-
relevant; and it is e-relevant justification that we are concerned with here.  
21 See, e.g., BonJour 1992. “Mentalism” is an alternative version of internalism according to which justifying factors 
are necessarily “internal” in the sense of being “internal to the person’s mental life” or “in the person’s mind” 
(Conee and Feldman 2004, p. 55). However, as I will note momentarily, an appeal to a mentalist version of 
internalism would be of no help in dealing with the case in question.  
22 By contrast, if (E3) were supplemented with a mentalist internal condition, it would still entail that the person in 
question is justified in believing q, for the support relation between the person’s evidence and her belief that q 
presumably would be internal in the relevant sense. Thus an appeal to a mentalist version of internalism is of no help 
in the present context.  
23 Again, there may be a purely externalist standpoint from which the person is not justified in believing p; but this 
would not be an e-relevant standpoint and so need not concern us here.  
24 As this point suggests, “actual support” views like (E3) and (E4) face a special challenge when it comes to 
embracing fallibilism about epistemic justification. Few would deny the possibility of justified false belief. But to 
the extent that such fallibility includes cases in which a person’s grounds clearly seem to (but in fact do not) support 
her belief, actual support views apparently do not allow for fallibilism.   
25 “Aspects” should here be understood to include either items of evidence themselves (e.g. experiences, other 
beliefs, etc.) or any evidential relations between items of evidence and the believed proposition. Thus there is no 
need to stipulate further that S must have access to the fact that the aspects of S’s evidence to which S has access in 
fact support p, for as it stands (E5) can handle the sort of case that led to the adoption of an access clause in the first 
place. That is, given (E5), the person just discussed is not justified in believing q, for q is not supported by the 
aspects of her evidence to which she has direct and unproblematic access. Thus, the addition of this further clause is 
unmotivated.  
26 Clearly a similar story could be told about Daphne. It might, for instance, take the same sort of extreme measures 
to get Daphne to “recall” the evidence she is suppressing. If so, she too lacks the kind of access to this evidence that 
is required by (E5) and thus is justified in believing as she does.  
27 Another strategy would be to incorporate a purely negative condition according to which justification requires not 
exercising any vices of intellectual character. One problem with this condition is that it sheds no light on what, 
positively, is required for justification beyond the satisfaction of (E5). Moreover, as I will get to below, it may be 
possible for a belief to be justified from an e-relevant standpoint even though the person who holds the belief 
displays intellectual vices at the time the belief is formed. 
28 An additional worry might be that the introduction of the second clause would make the first clause obsolete. That 
is, it might be said that an intellectually virtuous person (characteristically) would accept a proposition only if this 
proposition were well-supported by his grounds. I will not attempt to resolve this issue here. 
29 For a further discussion of such cases and of the problems they present for a virtue-based analysis of justification 
or knowledge, see Baehr 2006.  
30 It does not follow that my agency is completely idle. However, as Linda Zagzebski (1999) has shown, any 
plausible virtue-based account of justification or knowledge must (in order to deal with Gettier cases and related 
issues) posit a rather tight connection between the concept of knowledge or justification, on the one hand, and the 
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concept of an intellectual virtue, on the other, such that a person’s belief counts as justified only if an exercise of 
intellectual virtue (or something like it) plays a salient causal role or constitutes the best explanation for the 
formation of this belief. In the present case, even if my agency were not completely idle, it clearly would not be the 
best explanation for why I form the belief in question; again, the best and most salient explanation for the this belief 
is simply the proper (and brute) functioning of my visual faculty. It is also worth noting the possibility that my 
agency might in some sense work against the formation of my belief in this case. Being under an imminent writing 
deadline, I might try to deny what has just occurred (i.e. that the lights have gone out); I might, to a certain extent, be 
incredulous. Here I would be attempting to resist the truth and so would be displaying a kind of intellectual vice. 
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that I would be unable to resist the force of my own (brute) cognitive nature 
and would come to believe (and indeed to know – even from an evidentialist standpoint) that the lights have gone 
out. This shows how e-relevant justification is in fact consistent with certain forms of intellectually vicious agency.  
31 A similar story could be told regarding the beliefs of George and Doris. George’s agency is involved in the 
formation of his belief to the extent that it explains his intellectual laziness and obliviousness. And Daphne’s is 
involved to the extent that it is the cause of her ignoring or suppressing the relevant counterevidence.  
32 As indicated in nt. 30 above, it is important that personal agency make a salient (vs., say, a minimal or 
background) contribution to or that it largely determine the subject’s evidential situation.  
33 Nor does it require certain other elements of genuine virtue: e.g. that the person in question take pleasure in her 
virtuous action. This feature of (CEJ) is important, since a version of evidentialism that required actual virtue 
possession would be unreasonably demanding.  
34 “Characteristically” is important here since even the most intellectually virtuous sometimes err.  
35 Some evidentialists (e.g. Conee and Feldman 2004) seem to equate the notions of good evidence and good 
epistemic reasons. Given a broad enough understanding evidence, this strikes me as a plausible identification.  
36 P. 8.  
37 See, e.g., BonJour and Sosa 2003, pp. 175-77. BonJour cites cases of “epistemic poverty” as one reason for not 
identifying justification and epistemic responsibility. For instance, if a person’s epistemic resources relative to a 
given claim are (through not fault of his own) severely limited, the person might be epistemically responsible in 
accepting this claim even while lacking genuinely good evidence or reasons in support of it (and thus failing to be 
justified). 
38 Ch. 4. See esp. pp. 106-110. 
39 Ibid., 110-15. 
40 Ibid., pp. 133-37. 
41 E.g., ibid., pp. 110-15. BonJour also hints at a similar requirement for empirical justification in 1985, pp. 42. 
42 1998, p. 113. Moreover, according to BonJour, a priori justification also requires that the person in question grasp 
the necessity of the relevant proposition. 
43 Ibid., pp. 112, 116.  
44 Ibid., 137.  
45 Ibid., p. 136. 
46 Ibid., p. 137. If it did, then the reasons and the resulting justification would no longer be purely a priori, since the 
activity in question is an empirical phenomenon.  
47 This could also be described as a “responsibility-component.” However, the former is more accurate and 
illuminating since it is precisely the sort of conduct characteristic of intellectual virtue that is required for epistemic 
responsibility.  
48 This is suggested, for instance, by his various characterizations of the way in which dogmatism or bias (which the 
virtue-requirement is intended to rule out) might be involved with a belief. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 112-14, 127, 136-37.  
49 This is suggested by the very notion of a condition on justification. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
that this is a background condition and hence that its satisfaction is not – even for BonJour – a defining element of 
justification. 
50 It might be said in response that brute justification is limited to empirical justification and that since BonJour’s 
immediate concern is a priori justification, he is right to think of the satisfaction of his condition as necessary. But 
this is unconvincing. For presumably a subject can arrive at good a priori grounds in support of certain elementary 
necessary truths without exercising any virtues of intellectual character. Thinking in accordance with modus ponens 
or disjunctive syllogism, or judging that two plus one equals three, for instance, need not involve an exercise of 
virtuous agency. Even relatively brute cognitive functioning is sometimes capable of generating a priori 
justification. 
51 See Baehr 2004 for an overview of the field.  
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52 Linda Zagzebski (1996), for instance, defines knowledge (roughly) as true belief produced by virtuous motives 
and actions. 
53 For instance, it would be worth considering from the other direction, as it were, just how close the connection is 
between the notion of believing with good evidence and intellectually virtuous belief formation. It is reasonable to 
think that intellectually virtuous people tend to form beliefs on the basis of good grounds or evidence. But is 
believing in the absence of such grounds ever intellectually virtuous? In the context of this inquiry, the virtue 
epistemologist is likely to benefit from discussions among evidentialists about, e.g., what counts as evidence in 
general and as good evidence in particular. This, then, is a further indication of opportunities for cross-fertilization 
between the two fields.  
